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2 .Accumulation Game
Accumulation Game object
1.. 2 $\text{ }$ Players (Hider Seeker). $.n$ 1
( $k$ ) Hider Seeker :
Hider $a$ object $n$ 1
Soeker Hider $b$
.Seeker object 1. $\mathrm{k}$ object $N$ Hider




1. $n=3,$ $k$ =3, $N=2$, a=b=l













3 S\mbox{\boldmath $\alpha$} er Hider
3 Object Object
3 $N=2$ Hider



















1. p.396 of $\mathrm{K}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}/\mathrm{R}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}(1997)$
Pbature Easy altemative Hard alternative
Type of media Discrete Continuous
Nature of location Discrete Continuous
Relation of locations Independent Related
Numcer of searches per turn $\mathrm{F}\dot{\mathrm{n}}’\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}$ Vmiable
Finding probability 1 $p\in[0,1]$
Hiding rules One of each $\mathrm{l}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}/$ Variab1e
all at one location
Time Limited Unlimited
Movement of objects No $\mathrm{Y}\omega$
Result of finding Seeker $\mathrm{w}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}/\mathrm{s}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{z}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{s}$ object Seizure or more searches
data from other locations No Yes
Seeker strategy Random Game theoretic optimal
Hider information Location of $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{h}/\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}$ search Location of finds
1 Hider Seeker
Hider 3
(i) Noisy Case: , Hider Seeker
(ii) Quiet Case: , Seeker object Hider
Seeker
(iii) Very Quiet Case: , Hider Seeker
Seeker Very Quiet Case Noisy
Case Noisy Case
, object $M$ $\mathrm{A}$.
V(M :
$V(M, k)=. \sum_{1=0}^{b}P_{hI}(i)V(M+a-i, k-1)$ ,
$V(M,k)=\{$0if $k=0$ and M<N
1, if $M=N$,
, PM(i)= $\cross$ /
2. $n=100,$ $N$ =42, $a=b=3,$ $M$ =0, $k=20$ , 0.85324 $n=100,$ $N$ =
42, $a=b=3,$ $M$ =22, $k=10$ , 0.5389 $n=100,$ $N$ =30, $a=2,b$ =6














, 0.6 , .
3. p.406 of $\mathrm{K}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{a}/\mathrm{R}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{c}\mathrm{k}\mathrm{l}\mathrm{e}(1997)$
$k/M$ 0 3 15 25 28
5 0 000.9091 0.9947
10 0 00.05833 0.9991 1
15 0.0059 0.1496 0.9871 11
20 0.79 0.9231 0.9998 11
25 0.9942 0.9984 11
2.
unit interval $I=[0,1]$ Seeker $b<1$ $I$ $A$
Hider $a$ $I$ $f$ $f(t)dt=a$ $I$
$\int_{I\backslash A}f(t)dt\geq 1$ Hider Seeker $b<1$
$p(b)=p$ $I$ $b$
Seeker $1/p$ $\mathrm{b}./p,$ $(j+1)/p],j=0,1,$ $\ldots,$ $p$ -l
Hider $P(t_{0}, M)$ .
$f_{t_{0},\epsilon}(t)=\{$
$\mathrm{R}_{\epsilon}^{\mathrm{A}It-t_{0}-\epsilon}$ if $t_{0}-\epsilon\leq t\leq t_{0;}$
$0+\epsilon-t\epsilon$ if $t_{0}\leq t\leq t_{0}+\epsilon$ ;
0otherwise.
1 (i.e., $k=1$ ) $1\leq a$ $\overline{p}-\overline{1}L$ $e^{\underline{-1}}$
Seeker $P(_{p-1}". \cdot, \frac{a}{p}),j$ =0,1, $\ldots,p-1$ $\frac{p_{1}}{p}$ Hider
3.
1 $C$ $c_{1},$ $\mathrm{c}_{2}\in C$ mod 1 $A$ (c1, $c_{2}$ ) $c_{1}$ $c_{2}$
$c$ $c$ $A$ (c, $c+\delta c$) Seeker
$c$ $f(c)=a,$ $\forall c\subset_{-}C$ Hider $c$
player ( Hider $a\geq$ )
$a<1$ 0, $a \geq\frac{1}{1-b}$ 1 $1 \geq a<\frac{1}{1-b}$
$3.\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$ Accumulation Game
Quiet Accumulation Game ( Accumulation Game Quiet Case) Noisy Case
player
Quiet Accumulation Game $[\dot{9}]$ Quiet Accumulation
Game [10] $a=b=1$
3. 1 Quiet Accumulation Game with $N=2,k=3$
1 Quiet Case $(k=3)$ Hider $(N=2)$ 1





$Fi:$ $2$ Seeke Hider $i$ $6=1,2$ )
6 outcome
$NN,NFN,FN$V, $NFF,F$M$F$, $FF$
3 Hider Seeker Hider $\overline{h}\equiv(h_{1},$ $h$-N,
$\overline{h}_{F})$ $\overline{h}_{N}\equiv(h_{-}^{N},, h_{3}^{F1}, h_{3}^{F2})$ $\overline{h}_{F}\equiv(h_{-}^{F},$ , h3N 1 outcome
$N$ and $F$ 2 $\text{ }3$
hl: 1 Hider
$h^{N}\dot{.}$ , $i=2,3:(i-1)-$ outcome $N$ $i$
$h_{\mathrm{o},\wedge}^{F}:1$ outcome $F$ 2
$h_{3}^{Fi},$ $i$ =1,2: 2 outcome $\mathcal{F}i$ 3
Seeker $\overline{s}\equiv$ ( $s_{1},$ $s$-N, $\overline{s}_{F}$) $\overline{s}_{N}\equiv(s_{\underline{9}}^{N},s_{3}^{F})$ $\overline{s}_{F}\equiv$ ( $s_{2}^{F}$ ,s3N)
s’: 1 Seeker
$s_{i}^{N},$ $i$ =2,3:(i–l)- outcome $N$ $i$




$q$ (.|s1, $N,$ $s_{\underline{9}}^{N},$ $\mathcal{F}$) $)$ $\overline{q}_{F}\equiv(q(\cdot|s_{1}, F)$ , $q(\cdot|s_{1}, F, s_{-}^{F},,N))$ Hider
$\overline{p}\equiv(p(\cdot),p(\cdot|h_{1\prime}N),p$ ( $\cdot|h_{1}$ , $N,$ $h^{N}\underline,,$ $F$l), $p(\cdot|h_{1},N, h_{2}^{N}, F2)$ , $p(\cdot|h_{1},F)$ , $p$( $.|$h1, $F$ , $h^{F}\underline,,N$) $)$
$\overline{p}_{N}\equiv$ $(p (\cdot|h_{1},N)$ , $p(\cdot|h_{1},N, h_{\sim}^{N},, F 1)$ , $p(\cdot|t\iota_{1},N, h_{-}^{N},, F2))$ $\overline{p}_{F}\equiv(p(\cdot|h_{1}, \mathcal{F})$ ,
$p(\cdot|h_{1}, F, h_{2}^{F},N))$ $f(\overline{p}, q-)$ Hider Seeker $\overline{p}$ $\overline{q}$ Hider











$s_{1}\in$ ’. $q(s_{1})=$ Seeker
Seeker Seeker Hider $\overline{q}_{F}$ $\overline{h}_{F}$
: , Seeker Hider $\overline{q}_{N}$ $\overline{h}_{N}$ Hider
$f( \overline{h},\overline{q})=\frac{n-1}{n}f(h_{N}^{-}, q_{\overline{N}})\dagger\frac{1}{r*}f(h_{F}^{-}, q_{\overline{F}})$ $\vee.$
\check
$l’.\overline{q}=$ ( $( \frac{1}{n},$ $\ldots,$ $\frac{1}{n}),$ $q$-N, $\overline{q}_{F}$) $\overline{h}=$ ($h_{1}$ , $\overline{h}_{N},$ $h$-F)




$NN$ $N\mathcal{F}N$ Seeker $s_{1}\neq h_{1}$ ,
(1)$q(s_{\vee}^{N}, |s_{1},N)=\{\begin{array}{l}\frac{1}{n-1},\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}s_{\mathrm{o},\sim}^{N}\in I\backslash \{s_{1}\}.0,\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}s_{2}^{N}=s_{1}\end{array}$
$s_{1}\neq h_{1}$ $s_{2}^{N}\in\{h_{\underline{\Phi}}^{N}, h,\}$ ,
$q(s_{3}^{F}|s_{1},N,s_{\underline{\eta}}^{N},F)=\{$ $,, \frac{\frac{0_{1}}{n}nn-\underline{9}n-1)}{}$
, for $s_{3}^{F}\in I\backslash \{s_{1},s_{\eta,\sim}^{N}\}$ .
for $s_{3}^{F}=s_{1}$ ;
for $s_{3}^{F}=s_{2}^{N}$ ; (2)
$FNN$ Seeker
$FNN$ Seeker $s_{1}=h_{1}$ $\text{ _{ }}$.
(4)
$q(s_{2}^{F}|s_{1},F)= \frac{1}{n}$ for all $s_{-}^{F},\in I$. (3)
$q(s_{3}^{N}|s_{1},F,s_{2}^{F},N)=\{\frac{\mathrm{o}_{1}\prime}{n-1},\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}s_{3}^{N}=s_{2}^{F}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}s_{3}^{N}\in I\backslash ..\{\}$









$\frac{N}{h_{1}\neq s_{1},s_{2},s_{\theta}}s^{N}\underline,\{\begin{array}{l}\infty h_{2}\neq h_{1},s_{2}N1\mathrm{r}^{F}h_{2}=s_{2}s_{3}^{F}\frac{N}{h_{3}\neq h_{1\prime}s_{S}}1\end{array}$
$\frac{F}{h_{1}=\epsilon_{1}}s_{\eta,\sim}^{F}r^{N}’\iota_{2}\neq s_{2},s_{3}s_{3}^{N}\frac{N}{h_{3}\neq h_{2},s_{\theta}}1$
$\neg h_{1}=\neg h_{1}=s_{3}s_{2}NNs_{2}^{N}s_{\underline{\eta}}^{N}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}^{N}h_{2}\neq h_{1\prime}s_{2}1\frac{F}{h_{2}\neq h_{1},s_{3}}s_{3}^{F}\mathrm{r}_{2}^{N}h_{\theta}\neq h,s_{S}1$
2
Hider $\overline{p}$




for $h_{\underline{9}}^{N}\in I\backslash \{h_{1}\}$ ;
for $h_{9,\sim}^{N}=h_{1)}$ (5)
$p(h_{3}^{F1}|h_{1},N, h_{\underline{?}}^{N},F1)=\{$ $, \frac{\mathrm{o}_{4n- 9}}{\mathrm{L}^{n}-\lrcorner 3^{2},n(n-2)n(n-\sim \mathrm{Q})}\tau’$
, for $h_{3}^{F1}\in I\backslash \{h_{1}, h_{\underline{9}}^{N}\}$ ,
for $h_{3}^{F1}=h_{\underline{9}}^{N}$ ;
for $h_{3}^{F1}=h_{1}$ ; (6)
(7)$p(h_{3}^{F2}|h_{1},N,h_{2}^{N},F2)=\{\begin{array}{l}\frac{1}{n-2},\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}h_{3}^{F2}\in I\backslash \{h_{1},h_{2}^{N}\}\cdot 0,\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}h_{3}^{F\underline{9}}\in\{h_{1},h_{2}^{N}\}\end{array}$
$FNN$ Hider $h_{1}\in I$ $p(h_{1})= \frac{1}{n}$ \Leftarrow





$h_{3}^{N}\in’\backslash \{h_{2}^{F}\}$ . (9)
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$\mathcal{F}NN$ Seeker $\overline{s}$ Hider
$\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}_{n-}^{-2}\ovalbox{\tt\small REJECT}$
Hider $(5)-(9)$ $P_{H}^{*}$
1. Quiet Accumulation Game with $N=2,$ $k$ =3 $P_{H}^{*}$ player
$(1)-(9)$ 1 player at random
[9] Hider
$(1)-(9)$ [8]
p.186-189 1 [8] p.189
$P_{H}^{*}$ Very Quiet Case Noisy Case
3. $2.\mathrm{Q}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{t}$ Accumulation Game with $N=k$
N— $k$ ($n,$ $k$ , Hider Seeker
player
$t$ Hider Seeker $h_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $h_{t}$ $s_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $s_{t}$
$H_{\mathrm{t}}\equiv$ ( $h_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $h$t) $S_{t}\equiv$ ($s_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $s$ t) $H_{t}$ $S_{t}$
$h_{1},$
$\ldots,$
$h$t $s_{1},$ $\ldots,$ $s_{t}$ $p(i|h_{1}, \ldots, h_{t})\equiv p(i|H_{t})$ Hider
$i\in I\backslash H_{t}$ $q(i|s_{1},$
$\ldots$ , $s\text{ }\equiv q$ (i|St) seeker $i\in I$
2. Quiet Accumulation Game with $N=k$ $v\equiv v(n$ , $=\fallingdotseq_{\mathfrak{n}k}^{n-k\llcorner^{k}}$ player
$p(h_{i}.|H_{i-1})=, \frac{1}{l-\iota+1}$ for $h_{i}\not\in H_{i-1}$. $q(s_{i}|S_{i-1}.)= \frac{1}{n-i+1}$ for $s_{i}\not\in s_{-1}\dot{.}$ .
3. 3.









$N\cdots NpN\cdots N\mathcal{F}$ $N\cdot.\cdot\cdot Np.N\cdots NN\cdot\cdot N\check{\ell}\cdot+$
$\ell_{1}+\cdots+\ell_{m+1}=N$ $0\leq\ell_{\iota}\leq N$ for $1\leq i\leq$. $m$ +l.
Hider $t$
$p_{\ell}^{*}(h)= \frac{1}{n-t+r}$ . (10)
$\ell_{1}+\cdots+l_{t-1}+r+1\leq t\leq\ell_{1}+\cdots+\ell_{\gamma}+\mathrm{r}$ $2\leq r\leq m(r=m+1$ , $\ell_{1}+\cdots+\ell_{m}+m+2\leq$
$t\leq k+m$ , $r=1$ , l\leq t\leq ll+y
$p_{t}^{*}(S\mathrm{g}-1)=1$ $p_{t}^{*}(h)=0$ for $h\neq s_{t-1}$ . (11)
111
$t=\ell_{1}+\cdots+\ell_{r-1}+r$ $1\leq’$. \leq n\sim
Seeker
$q_{t}^{*}(s)= \frac{1}{n-t+1}$ for $s\in I\backslash S_{t-1},1\leq t\leq N+m$ . (12)
}1 $\leq \mathrm{a}\leq m+1$
$f_{a}(x;y_{1}, \ldots,y_{a})=f1(x.;y_{a})${ $f_{a-1}(x;y_{1}$ , ..., $y_{a-1})-fa-1$ (x-l; $y_{1},$ $\ldots,y_{a-1})$ },
$f_{1}(x;y)=x^{y}$ .
$v(n, N, 1) \equiv\frac{f_{1}(x,N)}{{}_{n}P_{N}}.$ ,
$r=2,$ $\ldots,$ $m$ +l
$v(n, N,r)=v(n,N,r-1)+ \frac{1}{{}_{n}P_{N}}\sum_{\ell_{1}=0}^{N-1}\sum_{\ell_{2}=0}^{N-\ell_{1}-1}$ ... $\sum_{\ell_{f-1}=0}^{N-\ell_{1}-\cdot\cdot-\ell_{r-2}-1}f_{r}(x;l_{1}+1,l_{2,\ldots\prime}\ell_{r-1},\ell, -1)$ ,
$p_{1}+\cdots+\ell_{r}=N$
3. $k=N+2$ (10), (11) (12) Hider Seeker
$v$ (n, $N,$ $3$)




$:.n$ $(V, E)$ , $V=$ $\{$ 1, . . . , $n\}$ $E=$ {(1,2), $\ldots,$ $($n, n-l)}





$n\geq 2k$. $+1$ Hider object $n,$ $n-1,$ $n$ -2, . . .




$n=k+1$ $n\leq 7$ Seeker
[11] Seeker $j$ $s$ (j) $s=$ ( $s$ (l), . . . , $s(k)$)
$s^{1}\equiv(2,3, \ldots, k+1)$ , $s^{2}\equiv(1,2, \ldots, k)$ ,
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$s^{2k-1}\equiv\{$
(1, 2 $\ldots$ . , . –1, $\ldots,$ $2$ , 1), $k$ $\emptyset$2;
$(2, 3, \ldots, \frac{k}{2}+1, \frac{k}{\eta,\sim}, . , . , 2,1)$ , $k$ ,
$y=2,$ $\ldots,$ $k$ -l , $k+y$ ,
$s^{y1}(j)=\{$
$j$ , $\mathrm{i}$f $1\leq j\leq\underline{\dot{9}}+\underline{k}-A1;$
$s^{y1}(j-1)-1$ , $\mathrm{i}$f $\frac{k-}{2}\mathrm{A}+2\leq j\leq k-y+1$ ;




$j$+lif $1\leq j\leq\underline{k-}\mathit{1}\pm\underline{\circ}$ )$1$ .
$s^{y1}(j-1)-1$ , if $=_{2}k\mathrm{L}\pm 1+1$ $\leq j\leq k-y+1$ ;
$j+y-k$ , if $k-y1$ $2\leq j\leq k$ ,
$s^{y_{\sim}^{\eta}}=\{$
( $1_{l}2,$ $\ldots$ , , -1, $\ldots,$ $y$), $k+y$ ;
$(2, 3, \ldots,\cdot,, \ldots, y\underline{k}+\mathrm{r}_{9}\underline{+1}\underline{k}+\mathrm{r}_{2}\underline{-1}\sim)$ , $k+y$ .
$n=k+1,$ $\prime n\geq 8$ $n=8$
2
(2, 3, 4, 5, 4, 3, 4) (2, 3, 2, 1, 2, 3, 2).




3 Quiet Accumulation Game (7) 4 Seeker
Quiet Accumulation Game
:
(1 ) Quiet Accumulation game player
player
2




(4) player $\backslash$ $[9]$
(5) Seeker Hider Noisy Very Quiet
(6) 33 Very Quiet Case
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